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"When people ask me what I mean by stable government, I tell them,
'money at six percent."'
General Leonard Wood, 1900
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Introduction
On September 13, 2011, Greece had a 98% chance of defaulting on its
debt within the next five years.' Greece's ten-year bond yield rose to
24.65% and the two-year note yield increased to 76.17%.2 This is far from
General Leonard Wood's definition of a "stable government." In June
2011, the unemployment rate in Greece reached a record 16.2%.3 In
March 2012, Greece exchanged its bonds for new bonds at a lower value,
which means that Greece will not repay some of its debt owed to private
creditors.4 Greece is not the only country having trouble repaying its
debt.5
How can financial markets put such pressure on a sovereign state and
its population? The rise of a sovereign debt market in the 1980s multiplied
the number of creditors from a few commercial banks to thousands of indi-
vidual bondholderS6 and therefore intensified the "holdout problem."7 In
the sovereign debt context, the holdout problem materializes when a nation
has trouble repaying its debt and seeks a debt-restructuring plan.8 Some
creditors will refuse to agree to the debt-restructuring agreement, attempt-
ing to either receive full payment of their claims or to acquire a greater
1. Abigail Moses, Greece Has 98% Chance of Default on Euro-Region Sovereign Woes,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2011, 9:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-12/
greece-s-risk-of-default-increases-to-98-as-european-debt-crisis-deepens.html.
2. Id.
3. Greece Unemployment Rate Rises to Record 16.2%, RTT NEWS (June 8, 2011, 6:01
AM), http://www.rttnews.com/Content/AllEconomicNews.aspx?ld=1641603&SM=1.
4. See Felix Salmon, Greece's New-Bonds Era Arrives, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/423101-greece-s-new-bonds-era-arrives.
5. According to Standard & Poor's sovereigns ratings list, several countries have
their bonds considered as "junk bonds," i.e., bonds that have a high default risk: Alba-
nia, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana,
Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon,
Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Uganda, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zambia. Sovereigns Ratings List, STANDARD & POOR'S,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-list/en/us?sectorName=
Govemments&subSectorCode=39 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
6. James M. Hays II, Note, The Sovereign Debt Dilemma, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 905, 917
(2010).
7. Id.
8. Debt-restructuring is a "imlodification of the terms of a loan to provide relief to a
debtor who could otherwise default on payments. The restructuring may involve
extending the period of repayment, reducing the total amount owed, or exchanging a
portion of the debt for equity in the debtor company." Debt Restructuring, FINANCIAL
DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Debt+Restructuring (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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share of the debt settlement.9 Notably, these so-called "holdout" creditors
will behave this way because sovereign debtors no longer enjoy foreign
immunity protection.1o
Foreign immunity guarantees that "sovereigns cannot be sued in for-
eign courts without their consent."" Since the second half of the twenti-
eth century, however, creditors have been able to sue sovereigns in courts
for certain types of commercial activities, including borrowing money.' 2
This change constituted a shift from an "absolute" approach to foreign
immunity to a "restrictive" approach to foreign immunity, raising several
issues for the sovereign debtors and their creditors.
If a creditor expects that other creditors will succeed in court against
the sovereign debtor, she will fear that nothing will be left to recover, and
may choose to "run for the exits," which means either suing or selling her
debt obligations amidst a crisis.' 3 This will ultimately increase the interest
rates on subsequent debt, which will further decrease the probability that
the sovereign debtor will repay.' 4
This practice is common among creditors. Hedge funds, or so-called
"vulture funds," bought sovereign "distressed" bonds at reduced prices and
then tried to enforce repayment of the full debt in court. 5 They have been
able to negotiate greater settlements with sovereign debtors.16 A famous
example is when the hedge fund Elliott Associates negotiated a settlement
of U.S. $56.3 million with the Republic of Peru.' 7
Although some scholars, as well as the heads of these funds,' 8 have
defended the "vulture fund" practice,19 most international institutions and
9. Steven L. Schwarcz, "Idiot's Guide" to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY LJ.
1189, 1193 (2004).
10. Jonathan 1. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt
Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47,
48-49 (2010).
11. Ugo Panizza et al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 651, 653 (2009).
12. Pablo M. Ros, The Elliott Acropolis?: An Analysis of Individual Creditor Sover-
eign Debt Enforcement Mechanisms 22 (May 2011) (unpublished J.D. thesis, Harvard
Law School), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/1m/select-
papers-from-the-seminar-in-international-finance/llm-papers-2010-201 1/ros.pdf.
13. Laura Alfaro et al., Gunboats and Vultures: Market Reaction to the "Enforce-
ment" of Sovereign Debt 4 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Emory
University Center for the Study of Law, Politics, and Economics).
14. Id.
15. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 10, at 49.
16. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 651, 657-58.
17. Id.
18. "Jay Newman, for example, is clear that his fund does not go after countries that
truly cannot pay, but corrupt, deadbeat countries that are "'dragging our legal system
down by disregarding the rule of law."' Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 4.
19. For example, Nouriel Roubini argues that "vulture funds" may be "part of the
solution rather than a problem" as "Iviultures are low-risk-aversion speculators who buy
low after a default, when debt prices have collapsed, in the hope of getting large mark-to-
market gains from a successful deal; this may make them more rather than less likely to
accept an exchange offer rather than litigate." Nouriel Roubini, Do We Need A New Inter-
national Bankruptcy Regime?, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcriviTY 321, 329 (2002).
699
Cornell International Law Journal
public figures have denounced this phenomenon. Gordon Brown, the for-
mer British Prime Minister, condemned "the perversity where vulture
funds purchase debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the
debtor country to recover the full amount owed" calling the result "a mor-
ally outrageous outcome."20 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank claimed that the vulture funds "interfere with the orderly
restructuring of sovereign debt,"21 and in the words of Anne Krueger, First
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, these practices reveal "a spotlight on
what is a missing element of the international community's current
approach to the roles of the public and private sectors in debt
restructuring."22
This Note seeks to provide this missing element. One might think that
sovereign debtors benefited from greater protection when creditors could
not sue them. On the contrary, this Note argues that foreign immunity for
sovereign debtors did not, and never will, provide effective protection.
Therefore, the only way to restore an adequate form of legal protection is to
create a sovereign bankruptcy regime.
Part I will examine the shift from an absolute theory of foreign immu-
nity to a restrictive theory of foreign immunity and will explain why the
holdout problem caused so much difficulty for sovereign debtors. Part II
will argue that even "absolute" foreign immunity has not been effective to
protect sovereign debtors. First, historical examples show that creditors
have circumvented foreign immunity to make sovereign debtors repay their
debt. Second, economics literature explains that sovereign debt exists
despite immunity because debtor nations have economic incentives to
repay their debt. Part III will argue that sovereign immunity should be
enforced at the bankruptcy stage. This Note will seek to explain why the
current situation is not satisfying and why several features of a bankruptcy
regime afford greater protection to sovereign debtors and their creditors,
drawing inspiration from several proposals made by scholars and interna-
tional institutions.
1. The Shift from an Absolute Theory to a Restrictive Theory of
Foreign Immunity in Sovereign Debt
In recent history, foreign immunity has evolved and its effect has sig-
nificantly decreased. The shift from "absolute" to "restrictive" immunity
has led to a challenge that many sovereign debtors now face: the "holdout"
creditors trying to attach sovereign assets wherever they can.
20. Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 4.
21. Id.
22. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
(Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.
htm.
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A. The Absolute Theory of Foreign Immunity in Practice
Foreign immunity was said to be "absolute" in the nineteenth century
and in the first half of the twentieth century.23 This meant that debtor
nations enjoyed complete foreign immunity and that creditors could not
sue to enforce repayments.24 Therefore, in theory, the lack of a bankruptcy
regime for sovereign debtors was mitigated by "absolute" foreign immunity.
The rationale was that foreign immunity guaranteed equality for sovereign
nations in the international community: "legal persons of equal standing
cannot have their disputes settled in the courts of one of them."25
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted this view in 1812 in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.2 6 The Court held that "the sovereign
power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a
sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather
questions of policy than of law, [and] that they are for diplomatic, rather
than legal discussion .".. ."27 Therefore, creditors used to appeal to the
President of the United States to enforce repayments from defaulting sover-
eign debtors.28
In practice, foreign immunity encompassed two principles-immunity
from suit, and immunity from execution.29 Immunity from suit means
that creditors cannot sue a debtor nation in court.30 On the other hand,
immunity from execution meant that should a court enter a judgment
against a sovereign nation (if the sovereign actually consented to being
sued, for example when it agreed to waive its immunity in a contractual
clause), the court would not be able to attach the sovereign's assets within
its jurisdiction.3 1
Jonathan Blackman, a renowned litigator on behalf of sovereign debt-
ors, distinguishes these two principles by explaining that immunity from
suit derived from the notion that a sovereign "should not be made to suffer
the indignity of being haled into court against its will," whereas immunity
from execution originated from "long-standing concerns about the disrup-
tions and political ramifications that can result from the seizure of a for-
eign state's property."32
Courts have dealt with issues of immunity from execution, especially
when foreign immunity eroded to a restrictive approach.
B. Restrictive Immunity: The Birth of the Holdout Problem
After the Second World War, jurisdictions throughout the world
23. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 653.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
27. Id. at 146.
28. Hays, supra note 6, at 910.
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started to endorse the "restrictive" theory of foreign immunity.33 This shift
is evidenced by the U.S. State Department's 1952 Tate Letter, the 1972
European Convention on State Immunity, the 1976 U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), and the United Kingdom's 1978 State Immunities
Act.34
In the United States, the change was in part the result of the Cold
War.3 5 In effect, the United States was reluctant to grant foreign immunity
to Soviet companies operating in the United States. 36 In the 1952 Tate
Letter, named for U.S. State Department's Acting Legal Adviser Jack B.
Tate, the U.S. State Department declared that states were not "immune with
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on
by private persons."37 However, because political considerations often
guided the U.S. State Department's interpretation of the Tate Letter,38 the
United States "officially" adopted the restrictive approach when Congress
enacted the FSIA in 1976, allowing creditors to sue a sovereign debtor in
U.S. courts if the complaint was related to a "commercial activity."39
In connection with sovereign debt litigation, the Supreme Court later
held that issuing bonds in the United States constituted a commercial
activity. 40 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, held that "the for-
eign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of FSIA"
when "a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market, but in the
manner of a private player within it." 4 '
As a result, creditors could attempt to argue for repayment from sover-
eign debtors, and landmark cases such as Elliott Associates v. Banco de la
Nacion (Peru) exemplified this new possibility. 42 In Elliott Associates, Elli-
ott Associates, a hedge fund, acquired debt guaranteed by the Peruvian gov-
ernment, at a large discount, just prior to Peru's 1996 Brady Deal.4 3 Elliott
obtained a prejudgment attachment order against Peruvian assets that were
used for commercial purposes in the United States as well as a $57 million
33. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 653.
34. Ros, supra note 12, at 24.
35. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 653.
36. Id.
37. Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 20.
38. Id.
39. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. H§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611).
40. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992).
41. Id. at 614.
42. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 657. See generally Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de
la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (giving the background for the series of judg-
ments in the Elliott Associates case).
43. In the 1980s, Nicholas Brady, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, announced a plan to
"securitize" sovereign debt. Before that plan, banks mainly owned sovereign debt obliga-
tions. The so-called "Brady Plan" meant that these loan obligations (largely bank-
owned) were converted into bonds to be pooled together and sold in the secondary
markets. The idea was to ensure repayment by troubled debtor nations so that banks
could exit the market for sovereign loans. Jill. E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043,
1067 (2004).
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judgment against Peru.44 Elliott then convinced a Brussels appellate court
to order Euroclear, a payment provider,45 to suspend payments on Brady
bond interest payments.46 Consequently, Peru decided to settle with Elli-
ott Associates for $56.3 million rather than continue to litigate. 7
This case created a great deal of controversy, as some commentators
feared that holdout creditors (such as Elliott Associates) would ask courts
to block payments agreed to as part of a debt restructuring and therefore
create a "seemingly formidable obstacle to orderly sovereign debt restruc-
turings."*4  Even though the legal argument that Elliott Associates used to
convince the Belgian court has not proved effective in subsequent litiga-
tion,49 the outcome of the Elliott Associates case provided great incentives
for holdout creditors to sue sovereign debtors. In the case of Greece,
should it default, some have also argued that creditors, including "vulture
funds,"50 could bring civil claims against Greece and cause another
holdout problem.5 ' "A sovereign debt crisis can be a painful experience
for both the debtor and its creditors; a mismanaged sovereign debt crisis
can be a catastrophically painful experience."52
However, the issue of attachment of sovereign assets still remains
unresolved for holdout creditors.53 Although U.S. and European jurisdic-
tions have been able to enforce their decisions by attaching government
revenues or other payments that pass through the United States or
44. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 657.
45. Euroclear is a provider of post-trade services. They help their clients "to settle
domestic and cross-border securities transactions and safekeep their investments."
About Euroclear, EUROCLEAR, http://www.euroclear.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
46. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 657.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 658.
49. In effect, Elliott convinced the court to adopt a broad interpretation of the "pari
passu clause" in the debt contract. More conventional interpretations of such clauses
have prevailed and now Elliott's interpretation is being challenged in court and by legal
scholars. Id. A pari passu clause "prevents the borrower from incurring obligations to
other creditors that rank legally senior to the debt instrument containing the clause."
Lee C. Buchheit &Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,
53 EMORY LJ. 869, 872 (2004) (discussing how pari passu clauses evolved and their use
in sovereign debt contracts). For example, in LNC v. Nicaragua, the Belgian Court of
Appeals held that the pari passu clause did not give the creditor, LNC, the right to attach
payments channelled through Euroclear because Euroclear was not a party to the con-
tract in which the pari passu clause arose. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 658.
50. See Philip Aldrick, Vulture Funds to Profit From a Second Greek Bailout, TELEGRAPH
(June 25, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8598657/Vulture-
funds-to-profit-from-a-second-Greek-bailout.html.
51. Ros, supra note 12, at 52-53 ("Under current Greek statutory and case law, a
creditor of Greece who receives a haircut on his bond based on a restructuring or a
default, could bring a lawsuit in Greek courts and, if the creditor were to prevail, he
could attach Greek municipal fees and taxes.").
52. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt 7 (Duke Law
Scholarship Repository, Working Paper No. 47, 2010), available at http://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/faculty-scholarship/2336.
53. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 659.
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Europe,54 holdout creditors usually face difficulties attaching sovereign
assets. Legal breakthroughs, such as in Elliott Associates, remain the excep-
tion rather than the rule. For example, Belgium changed its national law
after Elliott Associates succeeded in attaching Peruvian payments that
passed through the Euroclear system."5 Economic research has also found
that the "vulture regime" is "very weak" when it comes to enforcing repay-
ment of sovereign debts. 56
Therefore, we might wonder why creditors lend money to sovereigns
when it is so difficult to enforce their claims. Additionally, we might also
wonder how it was possible that sovereign debt existed when "absolute"
foreign immunity was in place.
II. Lessons from the Past and Economics: Foreign Immunity Cannot
Protect Debtor Nations
The evolution from complete sovereign immunity to a restrictive
approach no longer protects sovereign debtors from suits. Even given for-
eign immunity, however, debtor nations would not necessarily enjoy any
effective protection for two reasons. First, when foreign immunity was
absolute, creditors enforced their claims via different mechanisms that
went beyond any foreign immunity protection. Second, economics litera-
ture has analyzed the economics of sovereign debt and has argued that
other incentives lead debtor nations to repay their debt, meaning that for-
eign immunity is not a truly critical, nor meaningful, concept in the sover-
eign debt context.
A. How Creditors Have Historically Circumvented Foreign Immunity
The Gold Standard period, from 1880 to 1914,57 is particularly inter-
esting because it was an era of "high bond finance."58 Firms financed their
investment projects through debt such as bonds.59 European countries, as
well as Central and South American countries, widely issued sovereign
debt.6 0 This debt was primarily issued in the London Stock Exchange, and
creditor countries came primarily from Western Europe (led by Great Brit-
ain).61 The United States also became a major creditor nation later in the
54. These assets or payments were oil sales, VAT payments, landing fees from U.S.-
based airlines, and privatization revenues. Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 3.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. See also Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 653; Ros, supra note 12, at 25.
57. We call this period the "gold standard" because it was the dominant monetary
system at that time, i.e., the standard economic unit of account was a fixed mass of gold.
See THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA EcON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStan-
dard.htmI (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
58. KrisJames Mitchener & Marc. D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt
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twentieth century and started representing its citizen-creditors on the inter-
national scene. 62
At that time, creditor nations used various coercive mechanisms to
regulate sovereign debt and to enforce debt repayment claims. First, these
creditor nations used their militaries to enforce repayment of sovereign
debt. Second, creditor nations also sought to "administer" the public pol-
icy of these sovereign debtors, a practice which some historians and econo-
mists have referred to as "house arrest."63
1. Gunboat Diplomacy
During the Gold Standard period, many Western countries used mili-
tary might to force sovereign debtors to repay their debt. Perhaps the most
salient example of "gunboat diplomacy" is Great Britain and Germany's
intervention in Venezuela in 1902. In 1902, British and German warships
attacked Venezuela's coastal fortifications until Venezuela repaid its debt to
British and German citizens. 64
Creditor countries viewed this type of action as justified by public
international law. One of the canons of public international law was that
"a state had a legitimate interest in seeing that its subjects were not mis-
treated by foreign states."65 Creditor countries, such as Great Britain,
interpreted this principle to find "mistreatment" whenever a sovereign
debtor did not repay its debt to a creditor state's citizen. 66
Similarly, the United States led military interventions in debtor coun-
tries such as Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic,
and Panama.67 Debt collection and investment protection were major fac-
tors leading to U.S. military intervention in these countries.68 The famous
"Rule of March 3, 1922" stated that the Executive Branch of the U.S. Gov-
ernment should supervise loans made by private investors to foreign
governments.69
However, these "super-sanctions" were less common in the twentieth
century. In 1907, the Drago Doctrine, named for the Argentine jurist Luis
Drago, expressed the view that public debt should not give rise to military
occupation of debtor countries. 70 This view spread in the international
community, as well as in the United States where newly elected President
Franklin D. Roosevelt ended the "Rule of March 3, 1922" when he declared
62. Ros, supra note 12, at 12.
63. Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 58, at 6.
64. Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 Ciii.
J. INT'L L. 333, 336 (2005).
65. Id. at 335.
66. For example, in 1848, the British representative to foreign states contended in a
circular that the British government was legally entitled to "interfere authoritatively" in
support of "the unsatisfied claims of British subjects who are holders of public bonds
and money securities" to foreign sovereigns. Id. at 335-36.
67. Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and Empire: Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in
Latin America, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 39, 41 (2010).
68. Id. at 41. See also Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 10-12.
69. Buchheit, supra note 64, at 337.
70. Id.
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that the Executive Branch should no longer be involved in settlement nego-
tiations of private loans to foreign governments. 7 ' At that time, sovereigns
were becoming progressively less immune to legal actions.72
2. House Arrest
The practice of "house arrest," the foreign administration of a debtor
country's internal affairs, also shows that foreign immunity has never pro-
vided effective protection. This form of "super-sanction" was common dur-
ing the Gold Standard period.
The United States, under its foreign policy initiative known as "Dollar
Diplomacy," directly and indirectly administered governments of debtor
countries. The practice of "controlled loans" obligated debtor countries to
turn over tariff collection to the United States should the debtor sovereign
default on its loan.7 3 Other U.S. loans led to, for example, a 3% export tax
in Honduras in 1926 to repay the National City Bank of New York and the
appointment of a team of U.S. advisors to administer Bolivia's financial
affairs.74
The United States practice of "house arrest" also took more indirect
forms. For example, U.S. State Department representatives lobbied the
Colombian government in 1923 to enact tax collection and public adminis-
tration reforms.75 This led the Colombian government to enact reforms,
and U.S. State Department representatives oversaw their implementation.7 6
Western European countries also engaged in "house arrest" practices,
such as when Great Britain and France administered the governments of
Egypt, Greece, and Turkey in the early twentieth century. Egypt ceded
authority to the British administration to decrease its debt ratio and
improve its tax structure.77 The British administration implemented a new
tax collection system and "restored fiscal discipline."78
A committee of foreign bondholders administered customs collection
and controlled the finances after defaults in Greece and Turkey.79 In
Greece, the financial commission brought fiscal reform to the country,
which increased its borrowing power.80 France and Germany negotiated
deals with Turkey to invest in railroad building.81 However, these improve-
ments had a cost-the government of Egypt was placed under "house
arrest" for thirty-two years, Greece for fifteen years, and Turkey for thirty-
one years.82
71. Id.
72. Ros, supra note 12, at 15.
73. Ahmed et al., supra note 67, at 40.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id. at 40.
76. Id.
77. See Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 58, at 19.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Therefore, private creditors were able to circumvent the foreign immu-
nity protection thanks to "super-sanctions" levied by their home countries.
This practice was quite common. During the Gold Standard period, gun-
boat diplomacy and house arrests were used in twelve out of forty-three
sovereign defaults (or 28% of all defaults during that period).8 3 The aver-
age length of control by foreign powers was approximately 11.25 years.8 4
"For every year a country was in default, there was more than a one in four
chance that it would be subjected to military intervention by a creditor
nation or the establishment of an international financial council that
administered various aspects of the debtor's finances."8 5
It is therefore apparent that sovereign immunity has not been effective
to truly protect sovereign debtors. During the recent crisis, it is interesting
to note that some form of "house arrest" has reappeared via the significant
changes in the governments of Greece and Italy, even if these are not
directly controlled by foreign powers.8 6 Given the past result of prolonged
foreign administration, it does not appear that this is the ideal solution.
B. Sovereign Debt in Economic Literature: Why Sovereigns Have
Incentives to Repay Their Debt
In addition to "super-sanctions," economists have found other reasons
why sovereign debtors would be willing to repay their debt. This section
discusses the major factors economists have identified to explain the eco-
nomic incentives that apply to debtor nations. These factors include access
to a debt market, borrowing costs, trade reductions, and domestic costs.
However, some of these findings have been much debated in the eco-
nomic field and remain unsettled.8 7 Also, one factor alone may not be
sufficient to explain why a sovereign will not default. Therefore, we should
view these principles as complementary. Consequently, the sovereign debt
market does not require foreign immunity protection because it provides
creditors with influence and power that are more indirect than the "super-
sanctions" as discussed earlier in this Note.
Economics literature has found that four factors affect the conse-
quences of a sovereign default and explain why a sovereign debtor has
incentives to avoid default: decreased access to the sovereign debt market,
increased costs of borrowing, reductions in trade, and domestic costs on
the defaulting sovereign debtor.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Rachel Donadio & Elisabetta Povoledo, Berlusconi Steps Down, and Italy
Pulses With Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/
world/europe/silvio-berlusconi-resign-italy-austerity-measures.html; Elinda Labro-
poulou & Andrew Carey, Greek Prime Minister Set to Resign, CNN (Nov. 9, 2011, 1:11
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/1 1/09/news/international/Papandreoutoresign.
cnnw/index.htm.
87. See generally Panizza et al., supra note 11.
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1. Access to the Debt Market
First, some economists have found that, in general, a capital market
exclusion follows a sovereign default.88 International capital market exclu-
sions have occurred in the past. For example, British creditors formed the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) in 1868.89 The CFB played a
role in denying countries with a poor credit reputation access to capital
markets.90 It achieved this goal by publishing economic data on sovereign
debt burdens and tax revenues "to discourage investment in countries that
did not repay their debt."9 '
If "access" to international capital markets is understood to mean sov-
ereigns issuing bonds or banks borrowing in international markets,
defaulting countries in the 1980s were excluded from international capital
markets for an average period of four years after their default ended.92
Some economists have found five-and-a-half year exclusion periods with
broader definitions of "access."93 In the mid-term (i.e., five to ten years), a
renewed access to capital markets followed most sovereign defaults.94
Therefore, capital market exclusions cannot entirely explain the sovereign
debtors' economic incentives to repay.95
2. Cost of Borrowing
When a sovereign debtor defaults on its debt, it will typically face an
immediate rise in borrowing costs. In effect, economists have found that
spreads96 of a defaulting country are about 400 basis pointS9 7 higher in
the first year after the default occurs.98
However, these effects on borrowing costs are not permanent.
"Defaults do not seem to affect borrowing costs in a way which is both
long-lived and quantitatively important."99 Rather, the rise of borrowing
costs has short-term effects and economists have not found that sovereign
defaulters sustain large "output" costs.' 00 For example, during the
1997-2004 period, the 400-basis-point increase fell to 250 basis points in
88. Id. at 675.
89. Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 58, at 4.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 675.
93. Some used the definition of "positive net transfers." Id. at 676.
94. "Almost all countries that defaulted in the 1980s regained international capital
market access in the 1990s." Id.
95. Id.
96. Spreads represent the difference between the bid and the ask price of a security
or asset. Spread Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
spread.asp#ixzzljj9S9rfN (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
97. A basis point is the equivalent of 0.01%. Basis Point Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/search/default.aspx?q=basis%20point#axzzlrXsBj3lL
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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the second year and "los[t] statistical significance, and quickly decline[d]
further."' 0
Therefore, the rise of borrowing costs partially explain why sovereign
debtors would want to repay their debt, but the incentive is only strong in
the short-term.
3. Trade Reductions
Often times, sovereign defaults have been followed by a decline in
trade flows. For the purpose of this discussion, a trade flow is a commer-
cial exchange between sovereign debtors and other countries. Although
some economists have found that during the Gold Standard period there
was no correlation between bilateral trade flows and sovereign default,10 2
other economists have found a correlation. For example, Andrew K. Rose
found in 2005 that debt renegotiations under the Paris Club103 procedures
were associated with a decline in bilateral trade of approximately 8% a
year. 104
Although there is much debate among economists about how long
these trade reductions last, there is consensus about the fact that defaults
are costly for export-oriented industries. 05 Also, there is empirical evi-
dence showing that higher levels of bilateral lending lead to higher levels of
bilateral trade flows. 106 As a result, some economists have found indirect
support for the thesis that a sovereign default has an impact on bilateral
trade flows. 0 7
4. Domestic Costs
Domestic costs are another strong factor that explain why sovereign
debtors prefer to repay their debt. For the purpose of this discussion,
domestic costs are the political cost to governments and their officials and
the economic impact on domestic growth.108 Some economists have
found, based on empirical evidence, that sovereign defaults can make eco-
nomic crises worse and cause output losses. 109
In effect, a sovereign default increases the risk of capital flight and
runs on banks. 110 For example, Argentina in 2002 and Brazil in 1999 both
faced a currency crisis."'I Argentina defaulted on its debt whereas Brazil
101. Id.
102. In effect, it seems that creditors rather used the "super-sanctions" as described
earlier in this Note. See supra Part II.A.
103. The Paris Club is "an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find
coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor
countries." CLUB DE PAus, http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
104. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 678.
105. Id. at 679.
106. Bilateral trade flows mean the trade flows between a sovereign debtor and the
country in which the creditors reside. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 679-80.
109. Id. at 680.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 680 n.45.
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did not.1 2 As a result, these two countries faced different economic con-
sequences.113 In Argentina, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)114 collapsed,
whereas it remained stable in Brazil; this explains why Argentina exper-
ienced much more economic trouble than its neighbor." 5 Some econo-
mists associated a fall in FDI with defaults in a debtor country." 6 More
particularly, this reduction in FDI flows was "concentrated in flows
originating in creditor countries."' 17 Economists have designed economic
models to explain that defaults reveal information about the institutions
and "structural characteristics" of a sovereign debtor, thus having an effect
on the confidence of investors.118
From a more practical perspective, the recent debt crises in Greece and
in other countries from the Eurozone, such as Italy and Spain, show that
the risk of default puts great pressure on government officials.11 9 This
political pressure can be such that government officials can be replaced
when their reputation is effectively undermined.120 Therefore, countries
repay their debt partially because of the political costs incurred by govern-
ment officials, although economists have not yet found a definite link
between sovereign defaults and political careers of the government officials
in these countries.121
These different factors explain why even foreign immunity, when it
was absolute, was not enough to protect sovereign debtors and their credi-
tors. Although some of the methods described have been effective in the
past to make sovereigns repay their debts,122 the international community
will probably not endorse principles such as military intervention or long-
term fiscal control whenever a sovereign debtor defaults on its debt.123
Economists have tried to explain why sovereigns want to repay their debt,
but these incentives do not answer the question of what happens if sover-
eigns simply cannot pay. Where the money is not available, incentives can-
not work. In 2011, Japan's public debt amounted to 208.20% of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and France's amounted to 85.50%.124 The U.S.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Foreign Direct Investment refers to an "investment made by a company or entity
based in one country, into a company or entity based in another country." Foreign
Direct Investment Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.
asp#axzzlrOKkAxaS (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
115. Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 680 n.45.
116. Id. at 680.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 681.
119. See Donadio & Povoledo, supra note 86; Labropoulou & Carey, supra note 86.
120. See Donadio & Povoledo, supra note 86; Labropoulou & Carey, supra note 86.
121. See Panizza et al., supra note 11, at 682.
122. See id. See generally Alfaro et al., supra note 13.
123. Alfaro et al., supra note 13, at 6; see, e.g., UN Charter art. 1, ("The Purposes of
the United Nations are [t]o maintain international peace and security. . . ."), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapterl.shtml.
124. Country Comparison: Public Debt, CA FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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public debt was 100.31% of the GDP in September 2011.125 These figures,
and corresponding figures for other nations, raise concerns about the risk
that sovereigns will not repay all or some of their debt.
The "super-sanctions" guaranteed repayment of sovereign debt, but
appear to be politically unacceptable at the present time. In addition, the
current legal framework is not satisfying because it fosters the holdout
problem caused by potential litigators.
Countries that are unable to repay their debt cannot wait for a miracle,
because the situation may well deteriorate further. Defaulting countries
may suffer from foreign administration of their economies for years, if not
decades. They will pay higher interest rates on their public debt, and the
austerity plans they will be forced to adopt may further stunt economic
growth.126 At worst, major conflicts can arise from future sovereign
defaults; we have seen that creditors' home countries have used military
force to assure repayment from sovereign debtors.
III. The Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime as the Best Equivalent of
Foreign Immunity
Because the current legal framework does not sufficiently protect sov-
ereign debtors and creditors, as argued above, this Part will highlight the
main principles of a sovereign bankruptcy regime that should be designed
and implemented at the international level, borrowing examples from
recent proposals made by scholars and international organizations.
A. The Current Framework Is Not Sufficient
The current framework for debt restructuring is insufficient to protect
sovereign debtors and their creditors. The contractual approach currently
in force and the international institutions that once renegotiated debt
agreements for sovereigns have both proved incapable of resolving the cur-
rent international debt crisis.
1. The Inefficiency of the Current International Institutions
In the past, the Paris and London Clubs resolved international sover-
eign debt crises. The Paris Club met with sovereign debtors and their sov-
ereign lenders to find a solution, while the London Club brought together
defaulting sovereign debtors and their international bankers. 12 7 However,
these "non-institutions"1 28 would not solve the situation today because
125. YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/indicators/us public.debtgdp (last visited Jan.
21, 2012).
126. EU Forecasts 4.4% Slide in 2012 Greek GDP, EUBUSINESS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://
www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/eurozone-growth.fd6.
127. FRAN(ois GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUC-
TURING CRISIS RESOLUTION: A PROPOSAL, BRUEGEL 7 (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://
www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mecha-
nism-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal/.
128. A former Secretary of the Paris Club, Mr. De Fontaine Vive, has referred to such
entities as "non-institutions." Ann Pettifor, just as in Kosovo, HENCICLOPEDIA, http://
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most of the public debt is in the form of government bonds, especially in
the Eurozone. 29 It will be much more costly to reach a consensus by
utilizing these institutions because there are many more investors. 130
Moreover, the Paris Club's debt-revision procedures created informal
priority rules among creditors of sovereign debt:131 "The priority tradition-
ally granted to creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilat-
eral development banks . . . is almost always respected . . . ."132 Informal
rules of this type have been much criticized because they increase the risk
of disorder when debtors seek to restructure a debt agreement due to the
lack of transparency and enforceability of such rules. 133 Also, creditor-
investors cannot easily anticipate what will happen to their debt holdings
in the event of a default,134 meaning that they will be more reluctant to
invest and lend money to sovereigns.13 5 Therefore, the international insti-
tutions already in place have failed to respond to the current debt crisis.
2. The Drawbacks of the Current Contractual Approach
The current system that the international community endorses is
essentially contractual and relies on Collective Action Clauses (CACs).
CACs are clauses in debt contracts that permit a "supermajority" of credi-
tors (as opposed to unanimity) to amend terms of sovereign bonds in a
debt-restructuring process. 136 For example, English law bonds typically
have a two-thirds voting requirement. 137
The main purpose of CACs is to avoid the holdout problem discussed
earlier, as a majority of creditors can force a minority of creditors (presum-
ably the "holdout" creditors) to accept a debt restructuring. 3 8 Creditors
thus have greater leverage to negotiate debt-restructuring agreements.' 39
Therefore, CACs are now quite common in debt agreements. 140
However, CACs have been ineffective in protecting sovereign debtors
and their creditors for several reasons. First, CACs constitute what some
scholars call a "private market solution,"141 meaning these clauses work
www.henciclopedia.org.uy/autores/AnnPettifor/JustKososvo.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2012).
129. GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 127, at 7.
130. Id.
131. Jurgita GrigienE & AkvilE Mockiene, Can a Sovereign State Declare Bankruptcy?, 3
BALTlc J. L. & POL. 125, 131 (2010).
132. NOURIEL RouBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL
CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 250 (2004).
133. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53
EMORY LJ. 1119, 1121-22 (2004).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Ros, supra note 12, at 17.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id.
141. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Com-
parison, 2 HARv. Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1872552.
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only on an agreement-by-agreement basis. 142 To explain this argument,
Professor Schwarcz uses the example of Argentina's default during the
2001 debt restructuring.143 In 2001, Argentina had 152 types of bonds,
issued in seven different currencies and governed by the laws of eight dif-
ferent countries.144 The result was that failure to approve the debt-restruc-
turing plan in one agreement made disagreeing parties holdout
creditors.145 This is precisely what happened to Argentina in 2001, when
several individual investors and hedge funds refused the restructuring pro-
posal and chose to litigate despite the fact that 70% of bondholders had
already agreed to the proposal.' 46
According to Professor Scott, "[tihe insertion of collective action
clauses in sovereign bonds is an exercise in futility . . . ."147 This problem
is linked to the potential conflicts of interest among creditors, because
holders of different financial instruments have different interests.148 For
example, holders of longer-maturity debt want immediate acceleration of
their debt, while holders of short-term debt do not.149
A second argument against CACs comes from economics literature.
Some economists have found that leaving sovereign debtors free to include
clauses similar to CACs in their debt is inefficient.o50 These economists
call for public intervention that will encourage debt-restructurings through
tax incentives or subsidies.' 5 1 Other economists have studied bond
yields' 5 2 to show that it is difficult in practice to distinguish between
bonds that have CACs and bonds that do not.153 As a result, CACs tend to
make the legal framework more obscure for creditors, making it more
costly for debtors and creditors to negotiate debt-restructuring
agreements.154
A final argument against CACs is more practical. Sovereign financing
agreements do not always include CACs.1 55 For example, during Greece's
142. Id. at 17.
143. Id. at 18 n.85.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id. at 17 n.84. See GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 127, at 14.
147. Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT'L L. 103, 129
(2003).
148. GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 127, at 15.
149. Int'l Monetary Fund, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mecha-
nism 12 (Feb. 12, 2003) (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & OlivierJeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign
Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime 6 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/
192, 2007).
151. Id.
152. Bond yields constitute "the return an investor will receive by holding a bond to
maturity." Advanced Bond Concepts: Yield and Bond Price, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/university/advancedbond/advancedbond3.asp#axzzlij9HRW91 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2012).
153. GRANVITI ET AL., supra note 127, at 27-28.
154. See generally Bolton & Jeanne, supra note 150; Gelpern, supra note 133.
155. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case
Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 2, 14 (John M. Olin
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debt crisis, only Greek bonds issued under English law contained
CACs,156 whereas local law governed 90% of Greece's total debt stock.15 7
Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a global solution since CACs do not
apply in all situations, especially urgent ones such as the Greek debt crisis.
The fact that the Greek government enacted new legislation to retroactively
include CACs in Greek law bonds during the March 2012 restructuring
offer158 does not solve the problem because it raises issues of predictability
as to whether the interest on these bonds will be paid and their principal
reimbursed.' 59
Other types of clauses have been utilized to try to resolve the holdout
problem, such as the pari passu clauses. Pari passu clauses guarantee that
"all creditors can be regarded equally, and will be repaid at the same time
and at the same fractional amount as all other creditors."160 In practice,
the sovereign debtor promises in the debt agreement that it will not
subordinate the creditor to others.' 6 ' However, recent litigation has called
into question the scope of these clauses, which encourages holdout behav-
ior.162 For example, in Brussels, a court authorized the hedge fund Elliott
Associates to recover funds from Peru based on an unconventional interpre-
tation of a pari passu clause.163
Scholars disagree on the real meaning of pari passu clauses in the sov-
ereign debt context.164 In Professor Gelpern's words, "the clause is a
blunt, unpredictable, and generally inadequate weapon to enforce inter-
creditor equity."' 65
In sum, the current legal framework is not satisfying as it does not
sufficiently protect debtors and creditors. Current international institu-
tions are not adequate to deal with the increasing number of creditors, and
CACs may increase the holdout problem. Pari passu clauses have failed to
address the problem and provide for equality among creditors because
courts and scholars have been unable to come to a stable and consistent
interpretation of such clauses.
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 541, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id-1713914.
156. Id. at 14.
157. Id. at 13.
158. Ben Rooney, Greece: Historic Restructuring Paves Way for Bailout, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/09/markets/greece-creditors-default/
index.htm.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 227-32.
160. Pari Passu Definition, INVESTOPEDA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pari-
passu.asp#ixzzljqlyn22w (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
161. Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1135.
162. Id. at 1139.
163. Id. at 1136; see also supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
164. See Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1139.
165. Id. at 1140.
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B. Why the Bankruptcy Regime is the Best Response to the Current
Debt Crisis
Implementing a bankruptcy regime is the best response to the debt
crisis that many sovereign debtors face. For a number of years, economists
and legal scholars found justifications for a bankruptcy regime. Principles
that are found in U.S. bankruptcy law are essential to protect both creditors
and debtors, such as an automatic stay, a system of priorities among credi-
tors, and the ability of a debtor to access priority financing.
1. General Views on a Bankruptcy Regime
Many scholars in the economics and legal literature have advanced
strong arguments in favor of a bankruptcy regime for sovereign debtors.
Among the advocates for a bankruptcy regime in the economics field, Pat-
rick Bolton and Olivier Jeanne have claimed that enforcing a bankruptcy
regime will lead to a more efficient and less costly debt-restructuring pro-
cess.166 The authors reasoned that individual lenders are able to make
their debt harder to restructure, and therefore it will be more likely that
sovereigns will repay this "hard debt" rather than debt which is easier to
restructure ("good debt").167 Therefore, a "hard debt" is de facto a senior
debt (i.e., it has higher priority for the debtor).168 Lenders can achieve this
result in several ways, such as lifting sovereign immunity, insisting on a
unanimity requirement for restructuring the debt, lowering the maturity of
the debt, or inserting acceleration clauses.169
As a result, individual lenders will compete to avoid a selective
default, 170 and this will make sovereign debt "excessively hard" to restruc-
ture from an ex ante perspective.171 For that reason, a bankruptcy regime
will be able to facilitate debt restructuring in a sovereign debt crisis.' 72
"Selective default" is one of the main reasons economists have found the
current framework unsatisfying because "sovereigns do not default in the
same way on different classes of debt instruments and this selectivity gen-
erates an implicit seniority between debt classes."' 73 Bolton and Jeanne
support a bankruptcy regime that will put this implicit seniority to an
end.17 4
166. Bolton & Jeanne, supra note 150, at 5.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. An acceleration clause is a "provision that allows a lender to demand pay-
ment of the total outstanding balance or demand additional collateral under certain
circumstances, such as failure to make payments, bankruptcy, nonpayment of taxes on
mortgaged property, or the breaking of loan covenants." Acceleration Clause, INVES-
TORWORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/36/accelerationclause.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2012).
170. A selective default occurs when the sovereign debtor chooses to default on some
debt classes whereas it will not default on some other debt classes. See Bolton & Jeanne,
supra note 150, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 10.
174. See id. at 7-10.
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In the legal literature, several scholars have criticized the absence of a
sovereign bankruptcy regime at the international level. "The extraordinary
aspect of state insolvency is that it operates in a legal vacuum without a
bankruptcy law."' 75 Therefore, many argue that a bankruptcy regime
should be created to fill the current judicial gap, 176 and others suggest that
implementing features of the U.S. bankruptcy framework would bring
more certainty and order to the current debt restructuring structure.' 77
Professor Schwarcz also argues that a statutory approach, similar to domes-
tic bankruptcy statutes, will help to solve the holdout problem and the
funding problem.178
Proponents of a bankruptcy regime have argued for some type of judi-
cial forum that will have authority to decide issues during the debt-restruc-
turing process.179 For example, the IMF argued for a Dispute Resolution
Forum (DRF) that will have "important rule-making authority with respect
to claims administration and dispute resolution procedures."' 80 An inde-
pendent judicial body will be beneficial for both debtors and creditors. In
effect, a court that has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters related to sov-
ereign bankruptcy will provide enforceable restructuring agreements in all
jurisdictions and act as a single entity that will interpret sovereign bank-
ruptcy law.181 Of course, this new judicial entity will require an indepen-
dent body of judges.182 This Note will not discuss the specifics of the
independent forum, but other international tribunals, such as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC),
implement independence of their judges in their internal rules and could
serve as guides.' 83
A bankruptcy regime will also require that countries adopt an interna-
tional treaty that applies to as many jurisdictions as possible. Although it
will probably take time for sovereign states to adopt this treaty, proponents
from the IMF have argued that countries could amend the IMF's Articles to
175. Philip Wood, State Insolvency: Bankruptcy Without a Bankruptcy Law, ALLEN &




176. See, e.g., GrigienE & Mockiene, supra note 131, at 131.
177. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1159 (arguing that a more transparent pri-
ority structure will facilitate debt restructuring).
178. The funding problem is about "enabling a sovereign debtor to obtain funding to
pay critical expenses during the debt-restructuring process." Schwarcz, supra note 141,
at 25.
179. See id. at 31.
180. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 149, at 16.
181. See ANNE 0. KRUEGER, A NEw APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 34
(2002).
182. See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 149, at 20.
183. See generally Rules of Court, Int'l Criminal Court, Code ofJudicial Ethics, ICC-BD/
02-01-05 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A62EBCOF-
D534-438F-Al28-D3AC4CFDD644/140141/ICCBDO20105_En.pdf (setting guidelines
for judges); INT'L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&
p3=0 (last visited June 17, 2012).
716 Vol. 45
2012 Too Big to Fail?
achieve "universality in the absence of unanimity."184 In theory, it would
be effective upon all members of the IMF, which already constitute a major-
ity of countries in the world. In the alternative, adopting an international
treaty will facilitate enforcement of sovereign bankruptcy law because
states signing a convention will be directly bound.185
Many commentators say that achieving an international system of
bankruptcy is unrealistic given the extent of such an endeavor. The prob-
lem with this skeptical perspective is that it disregards reality. As we have
seen earlier in this Note, an informal bankruptcy system is already in
place.186 Both sovereign debtors and creditors are suffering from this sys-
tem, because it does not promote an orderly system of priorities and, there-
fore, encourages the "holdout problem."187 Furthermore, this would not
be the first time that an international framework of legal rules and a judi-
cial forum with power to enforce those rules was created. The ICJ was
established in 1945 by the United Nations (UN) Charter and has jurisdic-
tion over all UN Members, 193 states in total.' 88 More recently, the ICC
was created in July 2002 when the Rome Statute came into force.189 121
states are parties to the ICC,o90 which can prosecute individuals for vari-
ous crimes and has jurisdiction over individuals coming from all states
parties.191 Ratifying a treaty could lead to the creation of a sovereign bank-
ruptcy court. The court may have jurisdiction over states parties, such as
the ICJ, and over private parties, similar to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
To understand exactly what a bankruptcy regime would consist of, it
is necessary to highlight the underlying principles of bankruptcy law that
should be implemented at the international level to protect both sovereign
debtors and their creditors.
2. The Specifics of a Bankruptcy Regime: Principles that Should Protect
Both Creditors and Sovereign Debtors
Previous sections having explained why a bankruptcy regime is
needed, this section will list several fundamentals of bankruptcy law imple-
mented in jurisdictions such as the United States. These features would
prove beneficial for debtors and creditors and improve the current situa-
tion. This section will also discuss proposals that legal scholars and inter-
national organizations such as the IMF make.
184. KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 34.
185. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 141.
186. See supra Part 1Il.A.2.
187. See id.
188. History, INT'L CT. JusT., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1&p2=1
(last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
189. About the Court, INT'L CiuM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/aAbout+
the+Court/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
190. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/
Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). Id.
191. Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2012).
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a. An Automatic Stay on Enforcement
Automatic stays on a sovereign's debt would protect the sovereign and
its creditors. An automatic stay is "[a]n injunction that automatically stops
lawsuits, foreclosures, garnishments, and all collection activity against the
debtor the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed."192
The debate over the implementation of a stay in the context of state
insolvency is not recent. In 1944, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter
White, considered the founders of the Bretton Woods Institution,
attempted to draft a stay provision for sovereign states in the IMF agree-
ment, which was quite similar to the Chapter 11 stay in U.S. Bankruptcy
law.193 More recently, the IMF made a proposal named the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) that includes some form of an auto-
matic stay.194
The main benefit of an automatic stay is that it promotes collective
action by preventing creditors from bringing suit.195 During debt restruc-
turing negotiations, there is often a great risk that creditors will race to the
courthouse because, individually, each creditor has an incentive to sue,
anticipating that all other creditors will do the same.196 This is known as
the collective action problem. Imposing a stay on creditor litigation elimi-
nates the race to the courthouse and remedies the collective action
problem.
However, some in the IMF have proposed alternatives to the automatic
stay on enforcement because, usually, a stay on enforcement includes a
general cessation of payment to all creditors.197 On that point, some pro-
ponents from the IMF have argued that a sovereign debtor should be able to
exclude some claims from the restructuring agreement so that the debtor
can address these claims separately.' 98 Since a sovereign default always
has an impact on financial and banking systems, as has been evident dur-
ing the recent crisis,199 a limitation on a stay on enforcement is desirable
to the extent possible.
A stay on enforcement should apply only to those claims that are in
the restructuring list of a sovereign debtor. Further, it is possible to supple-
ment this feature by an ex post rule that would also protect creditors dur-
ing negotiations. Some have proposed adopting a so-called "hotchpot
rule."200 According to this rule, "any creditor that had managed to par-
tially satisfy its claim through a collection on a judgment after activation
192. Glossary, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/Bank-
ruptcyBasics/Glossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
193. Wood, supra note 175.
194. See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 149, at 25.
195. See KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 37.
196. Id.
197. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 149, at 8.
198. Id.
199. See Merkel: 50 Pct Haircut to Cut Greek Debt by 100 BIn Euros, REUTERS (Oct. 26,
2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/27/eu-greece-programme-id
USL5E7LRO2120111027 [hereinafter Greek Haircut].
200. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 149, at 10.
718 Vol. 45
2012 Too Big to Fail?
but prior to the agreement would have the value of its claim reduced under
the agreement in a manner that ensures that all of the benefits of its
enforcement and collection had been neutralized."201 Such a rule would
make sure that an "aggressive litigant" would not harm creditors willing to
negotiate. 202
With the automatic stay, the debtor will enjoy absolute protection
from its creditors. In turn, the creditors should be able to require the sover-
eign debtor to assure that the value of its assets will remain the same. In
other words, the creditors should be able to ask for some form of "adequate
protection," which is a fundamental principle of U.S. bankruptcy law.203
For example, the sovereign may be required to assure that it will conduct
"policies in a fashion that preserves asset values." 204
b. An Order of Priorities Among Creditors
As suggested earlier, an informal priority system has developed in the
context of sovereign debt.205 For example, it is generally recognized under
the Paris Club debt-revision procedures that sovereign debtors will pay the
IMF first.206 Furthermore, "[m]ost sovereigns do respect a number of
informal rules, avoiding total chaos. The priority traditionally granted to
creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, and other multilateral development
banks (MDBs) is almost always respected .... ."207
The IMF's SRDM proposal also included a formal system of priority
among creditors by requiring the sovereign debtor "not to make payments
to nonpriority creditors." 208 The only justification the IMF proponents
found for this policy was that it would avoid "dissipation of resources that
could be used to service the claims of relevant creditors in general." 209
However, there are many other reasons for imposing a formal system of
priorities among creditors in sovereign bankruptcy.
Anna Gelpern, a scholar specializing in the field of sovereign bank-
ruptcy and debt restructuring, has found four reasons explaining why a
formal system of priorities will be more efficient than informal priorities.
First, a formal system of priorities will bring more certainty to the current
framework because, as discussed earlier, 210 creditors currently ignore the
priority that will be assigned to their debt.21' Second, a formal priority
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. In Chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy law, creditors are able to ask the debtor-in-
possession to make periodic or lump sum cash payments, or provide an additional or
replacement lien to protect the value of the creditor's interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 361
(2006).
204. KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 16.
205. See Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1122.
206. Grigiene & Mockiene, supra note 131, at 131.
207. RoUINI & SETSER, supra note 132, at 250.
208. KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 16.
209. Id.
210. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
211. Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1130.
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system will not be subject to each private creditor's approval.212 Under the
current system, a group of creditors will refuse to acquiesce to the priority
of other creditors.213 In that case, the holdout problem reappears and this
can lead to the failure of any debt-restructuring agreement. In contrast, a
formal system would impose priorities on private creditors to be enforced
in court. Third, if a court enforces a formal system of priorities, a sover-
eign debtor will be bound to respect these priorities among creditors. 214
Otherwise, the sovereign debtor could persuade a creditor to lend extra
money by assuring this creditor that it will have seniority on the repayment
of its debt. The sovereign debtor could then lie to the new creditor, or the
older creditors could be impaired because their claims will be "diluted" in
the new debt, and they will therefore have a smaller chance of being
repaid.2 15 By binding debtors to a formal system of priorities, a sovereign
bankruptcy court would prevent any misbehavior from debtors as well as
any panic from creditors. Fourth, if a country encounters financial trouble
an enforceable priority structure can quicken economic recovery-in the
absence of such a structure, there is a risk that new creditors will ask for a
harsh form of adequate protection, for example, by requesting a lien 216 to
secure their claims. 2 17 Secured claims in sovereign bankruptcy is unsound
because it results in seizing government assets.218 This can impair the
country's entire economy. Therefore, a court enforcing formal priorities
will be able to limit grants of liens to creditors.
Concededly, political controversy will ensue with respect to the assign-
ment of priorities. Some have even argued that a bankruptcy system will
not be effective to achieve compliance with a formal order of priority. 219
However, we can advance some main principles that will govern the rules
of the system of priorities. For example, we have seen that the recent Greek
debt reduction imposed a debt-restructuring on the private sector (mainly
banks) but not on the sovereign creditors.220 Countries should have prior-
ity over private creditors as a matter of international comity and because of
the potential impact of default on national economies. Further, domestic
creditors should be given priority over foreign creditors, because defaulting
on debt that the creditors' own citizens hold could lead to greater economic
turmoil. 221
Another counterargument is that, since they will now be aware of the
risk of default, creditors will have fewer incentives to lend money to sover-
212. Id. at 1141.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 1145.
215. Id. at 1144 n.85.
216. "Alien is "[an interest in real or personal property which secures a debt; the lien
may be voluntary, such as a mortgage in real property, or involuntary, such as a judg-
ment lien or tax lien." Glossary, MoRAN L., http://www.moranlaw.net/glos-
sary.htm#Lien (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
217. See Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1145-47.
218. See id. at 1147.
219. See id. at 1150.
220. See Greek Haircut, supra note 199.
221. Gelpern, supra note 133, at 1152.
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eigns. This argument is, however, weak. Creditors still lend to corpora-
tions in spite of a corporate bankruptcy system, 222 and there is no evidence
to suggest the same would not be true for sovereign nations. In the long
run, by acknowledging the risk of default, a sovereign bankruptcy court
will provide more incentive to creditors and sovereign debtors to be more
reasonable in extending credit and borrowing money.223
Therefore, we can establish basic priority rules that are beneficial for a
sovereign debtor and its economy. More complex priority rules will give
rise to extended debate, but this discourse is the price to pay given the
possibility that sovereign states may not repay some of their public debt.
The 2011 and 2012 credit ratings downgrades that agencies such as Stan-
dard & Poor's publish unfortunately confirm this new phenomenon.2 2 4
c. Priority Financing
A bankruptcy regime should implement priority-financing procedures
because they are essential for the sovereign debtor's economic recovery,
especially considering the fact that a debt crisis and an economic crisis
tend to occur at the same time. Priority financing is "new money from ...
creditors during the period of the stay."225 In exchange, the new creditors
will receive some form of priority on the new debt they extended to the
sovereign debtor. Absent any kind of priority financing, "a sovereign debt
crisis coupled with an exchange rate and banking crisis can result in sub-
stantially higher costs than a situation of financial distress for a
corporation."226
In corporate bankruptcy law, priority financing (also called "DIP
financing") helps preserve the "going-concern value of the firm." 2 2 7 Pro-
fessor Schwarcz argues that only the statutory approach, and not the "free-
market option" (i.e., the private contract clauses such as the CACs), can
solve the "funding problem."2 2 8 In a forthcoming article, he shows that
private market solutions are not sufficient to encourage new-money lend-
ing229 because of risks of change in national law on which the parties
would rely.230
According to Patrick Bolton, a statutory approach will permit the con-
nection of priority financing to a debt-restructuring agreement.231 New
creditors will have incentives to lend because their debt will have priority
222. See generally Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF
EcON. REv. 41, 58 (2003).
223. See id. at 64.
224. Gerrit Wiesmann et al., S&P downgrades France and Austria, FT.com (Jan. 14,
2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/78bf6fb4-3df6-1lel-91f3-00144feabd
cO.html.
225. KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 17.
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over older debt. This system could be similar to a Chapter 11 U.S. bank-
ruptcy procedure, where "[m]ajor decisions such as new investment or
asset sales and new debt issues are subject to court approval." 232
Similarly, the IMF proposed that the SDRM would provide "assurance
that any financing in support of the member's program [in the IMF]
extended after the introduction of the stay would be senior to all preexist-
ing private indebtedness." 233 However, the IMF focused solely on financ-
ing from the IMF in its proposal. Other financial institutions, such as the
World Bank, should be involved in the priority financing procedure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this Note argues that foreign immunity in sovereign
debt has evolved into a restrictive approach that enables creditors to sue
sovereign debtors. At the same time, sovereign creditors stopped using
"super-sanctions" against debtors, such as "house arrest" and "gunboat
diplomacy."
This Note argues that the absence of foreign immunity leads to a judi-
cial gap, leaving sovereign debtors and their creditors unprotected. The
holdout problem is such that sovereign debtors are unable to restructure
their debt. Furthermore, the holdout problem can aggravate the current
economic crisis, especially in the Eurozone. However, going back to the so-
called "super-sanctions" is not a solution given the prolonged harshness of
such methods.
For these reasons, the best solution is the creation of a bankruptcy
regime. A similar form of "foreign immunity" could be enforced because it
will protect sovereign debtors against suits from creditors via the automatic
stay. Priority financing that an independent judicial forum approves and
enforces will help solve the funding problem that many sovereign debtors
have to deal with. The international community should view the current
crisis as a unique opportunity to reform the sovereign debt system and,
using ideas that have emerged in the past, provide a general framework
that may be sustained in the future.
232. Id. at 46.
233. KRUEGER, supra note 181, at 17.
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